**SCIDaR Security Newsletter – Major Incidents & Trends**

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**1. Incident Summary: Key Regions & Trends (May–Sept 2025)**

| **Region / Country** | **Recent Incident Highlights** | **Emerging Trends from Verified Sources** |
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| **West & North-West Nigeria** | — Several large-scale kidnappings and armed attacks (e.g. over 50 abducted in Zamfara, attacks on highways and villages) [africacenter.org+2Solace Global+2](https://africacenter.org/daily-media-review/africa-media-review-for-august-5-2025/?utm_source=chatgpt.com)  — Oreke-Okeigbo attack (Kwara State): abduction of workers, killing of some police personnel [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025_Oreke-Okeigbo_attack?utm_source=chatgpt.com)  — Kwallajiya (Sokoto State, Tangaza LGA) attack, dozens killed/injured in farmsteads [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025_Kwallajiya_attack?utm_source=chatgpt.com) | — Kidnapping-for-ransom has become more widespread, increasingly organized.  — Bandit groups (e.g. Lakurawa) expanding operations, more audacious in rural areas.  — Significant economic cost: ransom payments in billions of Naira; disruptions to farming, trade, and travel.  — Cybersecurity threats rising, especially in urban centres (e.g. attacks on Nigerian Customs platforms; customs/ports disruption) [ÒGÚN SECURITY+1](https://www.ogunsecurity.com/post/five-major-cybersecurity-breaches-in-africa-july-august-2025?utm_source=chatgpt.com) |
| **Mali & Sahel Region** | — JNIM has intensified operations in Mali’s southern regions (Segou, Kayes), including major attacks and blockades of towns, seizures of military property [ACLED+2Solace Global+2](https://acleddata.com/update/africa-overview-august-2025?utm_source=chatgpt.com)  — Kidnappings of foreign nationals in Mali, including on industrial or infrastructure sites (e.g. factories) [Solace Global](https://www.solaceglobal.com/gis/070825/?utm_source=chatgpt.com) | — Terrorist groups are increasingly targeting economic/industrial assets.  — Border regions remain highly porous; groups are exploiting weak governance and logistical gaps.  — Use of complex attack methods, including ambushes, blockades, and abductions rather than just hit-and-run. |
| **Other Emerging Concerns Across Sub-Saharan Africa** | — South Sudan: sharp increase in kidnappings of aid workers; more than double those in 2024, with some fatal outcomes [AP News](https://apnews.com/article/1ca1ee05281c828dc9993b7e6bd9f03f?utm_source=chatgpt.com)  — DRC: attacks and displacement in North Kivu by armed groups (such as ADF) remain frequent and deadly (e.g. Komanda massacre, etc.) [Wikipedia+1](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Komanda_massacre?utm_source=chatgpt.com) | — Humanitarian / aid operations are under increased risk, especially in conflict / post-conflict areas.  — Displacement (internal) continues to rise, increasing risk for civilians and field staff.  — Cross‐border dynamics (refugee flows, militant movement) complicate operations and security interventions. |

**2. Risk Assessment**

* **Overall Risk Level:** High in many affected rural and border areas, especially in Northern Nigeria, the Sahel, and conflict zones in Central/East Africa. Moderate urban risks also present (crime, kidnapping, etc.).
* **Primary Risks Identified:**
  1. Kidnapping-for-ransom (both mass and opportunistic).
  2. Armed banditry / militant attacks, particularly in remote and rural areas.
  3. Disruption of logistics and operational access (roads, supply chains).
  4. Cybersecurity threats, especially for digital platforms relevant to critical infrastructure and trade.

**3. Advisory & Travel Guidance**

| **Advisory** | **Actions for Staff** | **Travel Guidance** |
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| **For All Regions** | — Maintain high situational awareness.  — Avoid travel at night; restrict movement to daylight hours.  — Use verified/transparency-enabled transport options with GPS and trusted local security contacts.  — Share live location details with trusted persons and/or security focal points.  — Ensure all staff have emergency kits and basic communications / evacuation plans. | — Route planning: use well-patrolled or major routes; avoid secondary roads with poor security coverage.  — Pre-travel briefings: check latest advisories and local security incident reports.  — Coordination: Inform local authorities/contacts of travel plans.  — Travel in pairs / groups if possible; avoid small numbers in remote areas. |
| **Specific Areas (Nigeria / Sahel)** | — Avoid non-essential travel to rural or border areas especially with known militant / bandit presence.  — Liaise with local security forces or partners who have up-to-date intelligence.  — Monitor community tensions (political, ethnic) which might precipitate violence. | — For Nigeria: avoid the North-West rural areas, known bandit strongholds; travel on highways with patrols.  — Sahel region: avoid crossing boundaries without assurance of safe corridors; limit exposure outside safe zones. |
| **Other Risk Domains** | — Cyber hygiene: strong passwords, 2-factor authentication, avoid unsecured networks.  — Humanitarian staff: ensure that identification and credentials are up to date; coordinate with agencies (UN/OCHA/INGOs) for secure lodging.  — Disaster risks: floods, displacement zones may reduce security; plan for these risks. | — Avoid overnight stays in high-risk towns, especially those with recent incidents.  — Use reliable accommodation vetted for security.  — Ensure contingency plans (evacuation, medical) are in place. |

**4. Strategic Suggestions for Senior Management**

* Strengthen intelligence gathering and regional collaboration (e.g. partnerships with ONSA, ACLED, national security services).
* Expand use of data-dashboards to capture kidnapping, banditry, militant activity trends; integrate mapping and predictive indicators.
* Increase investments in staff security training (both physical security and digital security).
* Review operational footprints in high-risk zones: consider remote work, relocation of offices, or delay of non-essential field missions.
* Advocate or collaborate with allied NGOs and government for safer access routes and enhanced law enforcement presence in logistics corridors.

**5. Latest Verified Updates (post-September 5, 2025)**

* According to SBM Intelligence, between July 2024 and June 2025, **4,722 kidnappings** were recorded in Nigeria; ransom demands reached nearly **₦48 billion**, though actual payments were about **₦2.57 billion**. [Vanguard News+1](https://www.vanguardngr.com/2025/08/insecurity-4722-abductions-n2-57bn-ransom-paid-to-kidnappers-in-one-year-report/?utm_source=chatgpt.com)
* ACLED data shows a sharp uptick in JNIM operations in Mali’s Segou and Kayes regions in August 2025 — including towns blockaded and attacks on security forces and civilians. [ACLED+1](https://acleddata.com/update/africa-overview-august-2025?utm_source=chatgpt.com)
* Cyber breaches in Africa are also on the rise: e.g., a major malware incident affecting South Africa’s National Treasury, breach of Nigeria Customs’ clearance platform, and data thefts in land/infrastructure authorities. [ÒGÚN SECURITY](https://www.ogunsecurity.com/post/five-major-cybersecurity-breaches-in-africa-july-august-2025?utm_source=chatgpt.com)

**6. Summary & Key Messages**

* The security environment remains volatile across many parts of Sub-Saharan Africa. Kidnapping, banditry, militant activity, and political instability are key threats.
* For SCIDaR staff, safety depends heavily on planning, using secure transport, limiting exposure, and staying informed.
* Operational resilience must be supported via data, real-time intelligence, training, and collaboration.